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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are often vulnerable to adversarial examples.
Several proposed defenses deploy an ensemble of models with the hope that,
although the individual models may be vulnerable, an adversary will not be able
to find an adversarial example that succeeds against the ensemble. Depending
on how the ensemble is used, an attacker may need to find a single adversarial
example that succeeds against all, or a majority, of the models in the ensemble.
The effectiveness of ensemble defenses against strong adversaries depends on
the vulnerability spaces of models in the ensemble being disjoint. We consider
the joint vulnerability of an ensemble of models, and propose a novel technique
for certifying the joint robustness of ensembles, building upon prior works on
single-model robustness certification. We evaluate the robustness of various models
ensembles, including models trained using cost-sensitive robustness to be diverse,
to improve understanding of the potential effectiveness of ensemble models as a
defense against adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been found to be very successful at many tasks, including mage
classification [11, 10], but have also been found to be quite vulnerable to misclassifications from
small adversarial perturbations to inputs [25, 8]. Many defenses have been proposed to protect models
from these attacks. Most focus on making a single model robust, but there may be fundamental
limits to the robustness that can be achieved by a single model [22, 7, 5, 14, 23]. Several of the most
promising defenses employ multiple models in various ways [6, 28, 15, 31, 18]. These ensemble-
based defenses work on the general principle that it should be more difficult for an attacker to
find adversarial examples that succeed against two or more models at the same time, compared to
attacking a single model. However, an attack crafted against one model may be successful against
a different model trained to perform the same task. This leads to a notion of joint vulnerability to
capture the risk of adversarial examples that compromise a set of models, illustrated in Figure 1. Joint
vulnerability makes ensemble-based defenses less effective. Thus, reducing joint vulnerability of
models is important to ensure stronger ensemble-based defenses.
Although the above ensemble defenses have shown promise when evaluated against experimental
attacks, these attacks often assume adversaries do not adapt to the ensemble defense, and no previous
work has certified the joint robustness of an ensemble defense. On the other hand, several recent
works have developed methods to certify robustness for single models [29, 26, 9]. In this work, we
introduce methods for providing robustness guarantees for an ensemble of models buidling upon the
approaches of Wong and Kolter [29] and Tjeng et al. [26].
Contributions. Our main contribution is a framework to certify robustness for an ensemble of
models against adversarial examples. We define three simple ensemble frameworks (Section 3) and
provide robustness guarantees for each of them, while evaluating the tradeoffs between them. We
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Figure 1: Illustration of joint adversarial vulnerability of two binary classification models. The seed
input is x, and the dotted square box around represents its true decision boundary. The blue and
green lines describe the decision boundaries of two models. The models are jointly vulnerable in the
regions marked with red stars, where both models consistently output the (same) incorrect class.
propose a novel technique to extend prior work on single model robustness to verify joint robustness
of ensembles of two or more models (Section 4). Second, we demonstrate that the cost-sensitive
training approach [32] can be used to train diverse robust models that can be used to certify a high
fraction of test examples (Section 5). Our results show that, for the MNIST dataset, we can train
diverse ensembles of two, five and ten models using different cost-sensitive robust matrices. When
these diverse models are combined using our ensemble frameworks, the ensembles can be used to
certify a larger number of test seeds compared to using a single overall-robust model. For example,
78.1% of test examples can be certified robust for two-model averaging ensemble and 85.6% for a
ten-model ensemble, compares with 72.7% for a single model. We further show that use of ensemble
models do not significantly reduce the model’s accuracy on benign inputs, and when rejection is used
as an option, can reduce the error rate to essentially zero with a 9.7% rejection rate.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly introduce adversarial examples, provide background on robust training and
certification, and describe defenses using model ensembles.
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Several definitions of adversarial example have been proposed. For this paper, we use this definition [1,
8]: given a model M, an input x, a distance metric ∆, and a distance measure , an adversarial example
for the input x is x′ where M(x′) , M(x) and ∆(x, x′) ≤ .
In recent years, there has been a significant amount of research on adversarial examples against DNN
models, including attacks such as FGSM [8], DeepFool [17], PGD [13], Carlini-Wagner [2], and
JSMA [19]. The FGSM attack works by taking the signs of the gradient of the loss with respect to
the input x and adding a small perturbation to the direction of loss for all input features. This simple
strategy is surprisingly successful. The PGD attack is considered a very strong state-of-the-art attack.
It is essentially an iterative version of FGSM, where instead of just taking one step many smaller
steps are taken subject to some constraints and with some randomization.
One interesting property of these attacks is that the adversarial examples they find are often trans-
ferable [4] — a successful attack against one model is often successful against a second model.
Transfer attacks enable black-box attacks where the adversary does not have full access to the target
model. More importantly for our purposes, they also demonstrate that an adversarial example found
against one model is also effective against other models, so can be effective against ensemble-based
defenses [30, 28]. In our work, we consider the threat model where the adversary has white-box
access to all of the models in the ensemble and knowledge of the ensemble construction.
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2.2 Robust training
While many proposed adversarial examples defenses look promising, adaptive attacks that compro-
mise defenses are nearly always found [27]. The failures of ad hoc defenses motivate increased focus
on robust training and provable defenses. Madry et al. [13], Wong et al. [29], and Raghunathan et
al. [20] have proposed robust training methods to defend against adversarial examples. Madry et al.
use the PGD attack to find adversarial examples with high loss value around training points, and then
iteratively adversarially train their models on those seeds. Wong et al. define an adversarial polytope
for a given input, and robustly train the model to guarantee adversarial robustness for the polytope by
reducing the problem into a linear programming problem. These works focus on single models; we
propose a way to make ensemble models jointly robust through training a set of models to be both
robust and diverse.
2.3 Certified robustness
Several recent works aim to provide guarantees of robustness for models against constrained ad-
versarial examples [29, 26, 20, 3]. All of these works provide certification for individual models.
A model M(·) is certifiably robust for an input x, if for all x′ where ∆(x, x′) ≤ , M(x′) is robust.
We extend these techniques for ensemble models. In particular, we extend Tjeng et al.’s [26] MIP
verification technique and Wong et al.’s [29] convex adversarial polytope method. Both techniques
are based on using linear programming to calculate a bound on outputs given the allowable input
perturbations, and using those output bounds to provide robustness guarantees. MIPVerify uses
mixed integer linear programming solvers, which are computationally very expensive for deep neural
networks. To get around this issue, Wong et al. [29] use a dual network formulation of the original
network that over-approximates the adversarial region, and apply widely used techniques such as
stochastic gradient descent to the solve the optimization problem efficiently. This can scale to larger
networks and provides a sound certificate, but may fail to certify robust examples because of the
over-approximation.
2.4 Ensemble models as defense
In classical machine learning, there has been extensive work on ensemble of models and also diversity
measures. Kuncheva [12] provides a comparison of those measures and their usefulness in terms
of ensemble accuracy. However, both the diversity measures and the evaluation of their usefulness
was done in the benign setting. The assumptions that are valid in the benign setting, such as, the
independent and identically distributed inputs no longer applies in the adversarial setting.
In the adversarial setting, there have been several proposed ensemble-based defenses [6, 28, 18] that
work on the principle of making models diverse from each other. Feinman et al. [6] use randomness
in the dropout layers to build an ensemble that is robust to adversarial examples. Tramer et al. [28]
use ensembles to introduce diversity in the adversarial examples on which to train a model to be
robust. Pang et al. [18] promote diversity among non-maximal class prediction probabilities to make
the ensembles diverse. Sharif et al. [24] proposed the n–ML appproach for adversarial defense. They
explicitly train the models in the ensemble to be diverse from each other, and show experimentally
that it leads to robust ensembles. Similarly, Meng et al. [16] have shown than an ensemble of n weak
but diverse models can be used as strong adversarial defense. While all of the above works focus on
making models diverse, they evaluate their ensembles using existing attack methods. None of these
prior works have attempted to provide any certification of their diverse ensemble models against
adversaries.
3 Ensemble Defenses
Our goal is to provide robustness guarantees against adversarial examples for an ensemble of models.
The effectiveness of a ensemble defense depends on the models used in the ensemble and how they
are combined.
First, we present a general framework for ensemble defenses. Next, we define three different ensemble
composition frameworks: unanimity, majority, and averaging. Section 4 describes the techniques we
use to certify each type of ensemble framework. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we talk about different ways
to train the individual models in these ensemble frameworks, and discuss the results. Our methods do
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not make any assumptions about the models in an ensemble, for example, that they are pre-processing
the input in some way and then running the same model. This means our frameworks are general
purpose and agnostic of the input domain, but we cannot handle ensemble mechansisms that are
nondeterministic (such as sampling Gaussian noise around the input [21], which can only provide
probabilistic guarantees).
General frame of ensemble defense. We useM(x) to represent the output of a model ensemble,
composed of n models, M1(·),M2(·), . . . ,Mn(·) that are composed using one of the composition
mechanisms. Furthermore, given an input x, true output class t, and the output of the ensembleM(x),
we use a decision functionD(M(x), t) to decide whether the given input x is adversarial, benign, or
rejected. FunctionsM andD together define an ensemble defense framework. We discuss three such
frameworks in this paper.
Unanimity. In the unanimity framework, the output class is yi only if all of the component models
output yi. If there is any disagreement among the models, the input is rejected: M(x) = ⊥. For the
unanimity framework, joint robustness is achieved when the unanimity-robust property defined below
is satisfied.
Definition 3.1. Given an input x with true output class t and allowable adversarial distance , we call
a model ensemble unanimity-robust for input x if there exists no adversarial example x′ such that
∆(x, x′) ≤ , and M1(x′) = M2(x′) = . . . = Mn(x′) , t.
Majority. In the majority framework, the output class is yi only if at least b n2 c + 1 models agree on
it. If there is no majority output class, the input is rejected. Joint robustness is achieved when the
majority-robust property defined below is satisfied:
Definition 3.2. Given an input x with true output class t, allowable adversarial distance , a model
ensemble is majority-robust for input x if there exists no adversarial example x′ such that ∆(x, x′) ≤ ,
and there is no class j such that j , t and
| {i | i ∈ [n] ∧ Mi(x) = j }| ≥ bn/2c + 1.
Averaging. In the averaging framework, we take the average of the second last layer output vectors
of each of component models to produce the final output. This second last layer vector is typically a
softmax or logits layer. We use Zi(x) to denote the second last layer output vector of model Mi, and
define the average of the second last layer vectors as:
Z(x) =
Z1(x) + Z2(x) + . . . + Zn(x)
n
Then, the output of the ensemble is:
M(x) = argmax
j
Z(x) j.
Joint robustness for an averaging ensemble is satisfied when the averaging-robust property defined
below is satisfied.
Definition 3.3. Given an input x with true output class t, allowable adversarial distance , we call a
model ensemble averaging-robust if there exists no adversarial example x′ such that ∆(x, x′) ≤ , and
there is no class j such that j , t andM(x′) = j, whereM(·) is as defined above.
4 Certifying ensemble defenses
In this section we introduce our techniques to certify a model ensemble is robust for a given input.
Our approach extends the single model methods of Wong and Kolter [29] and Tjeng et al. [26] to
support certification for model ensembles using the different composition mechanisms.
4.1 Unanimity and majority frameworks
The simplest approach for certifying joint robustness for the unanimity and majority frameworks
would be to certify the robustness of each model in the ensemble individually for a given input, and
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then make a joint certification decision based on those individual certifications. This strategy is
simple but prone to false negatives.
For the unanimity framework, we can verify that an ensemble is unanimity-robust for input x
if at least one of the n models is individually robust for x. This provides a simple way to use
single-model certifiers to verify robustness for an ensemble, but is stricter than what is required
to satisfy Definition 3.1 since compromising a unanimity ensemble requires finding a single input
that is a successful adversarial example against every component model. Hence, this method may
substantially underestimate the actual robustness, especially when the component models have mostly
disjoint vulnerability regions. An input that cannot be certified using the this technique, may still be
unanimity-robust. Nevertheless, this technique is an easy way to establish a lower bound for joint
robustness.
Similarly, for the majority framework, we can use this approach to verify that an ensemble satisfies
majority-robustness (Definition 3.2) by checking if at least b n2 c + 1 models are individually robust
for input x. As with the unanimity case, this underestimates the actual robustness, but provides a
valid joint robustness lower bound. As we will see in Section 5.3, the independent evaluation strategy
works fairly well for the unanimity framework, but it is almost useless for the majority framework
when the number of models in the ensembles gets large.
4.2 Averaging models
As the averaging framework essentially obtains a single model by combining the n models in the
ensemble, we can simply apply the single model certification techniques to that to achieve robust
certification. This gives us robust certification according to Definition 3.3. Furthermore, we can show
that this certification technique implies a certification guarantee for the unanimity framework. In fact,
the certification guarantee for the unanimity framework achieved this way has lower false negative
rate than the independent technique described in the previous subsection. We state this formally in
Theorem 4.1, and provide a proof below.
Theorem 4.1. If for a given input x, the averaging ensembleM(x) is certified to be robust, then the
component models M1(·),M2(·), . . . ,Mn(·) combined with the unanimity framework is also certifiably
robust according to Definition 3.1.
Proof. Let M1(·),M2(·), . . . ,Mn(·) be the n component models of the averaging ensemble, and let
Z1(·),Z2(·), . . . ,Zn(·) be the second last layer output vectors for each of these models. As described in
section 3, given input x we can define the average of the second last layer outputs as:
Z(x) =
Z1(x) + Z2(x) + . . . + Zn(x)
n
.
The final output classM(x) is defined as:
M(x) = argmax
j
Z(x) j.
For input x, let t be the true output class and u be the target output class. Now, if averaging ensemble
M(x) is robust, we can write Z(x)t > Z(x)u. It follows that Z(x)t > Z(x)u. Thus,
n∑
i=1
Zi(x)t >
n∑
i=1
Zi(x)u.
This implies that either Z1(x)t > Z1(x)u or
∑n
i=2 Zi(x)t >
∑n
i=2 Zi(x)u. Generalizing for any i, we must
have M1(·) is robust or M2(·) is robust or . . . Mn(·) is robust. Thus, inM(x), an unanimity ensemble
of M1,M2, . . . ,Mn is unanimity-robust for target class u according to Definition 3.1. Thus, if we can
show that a model ensemble is averaging-robust for all target classes for an input x, then it implies
that the unanimity ensemble formed with models M1,M2, . . .Mn is also unanimity-robust for input
x. 
This is again a stricter definition of robustness compared to the unanimity-robustness defined in Defini-
tion 3.1. This means, even though certification of averaging-robustness implies unanimity-robustness,
the opposite is not true. That is, unanimity-robustness does not imply averaging-robustness. There-
fore, we again get a lower bound of unanimity-robustness. However, the averaging-robustness is a less
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strict definition of robustness than the implicit independent certification definition described in the
previous subsection. Thus, this formulation gives us a better estimate of true unanimity-robustness.
In this project, we extend two different single-model certification techniques to provide robustness
certification for ensembles. The two different techniques we use are described below:
Using MIP verification: Tjeng et al. [26] have used mixed integer programming (MIP) techniques
to evaluate robustness of models against adversarial examples. We apply their certification technique
on our averaging ensemble modelM(·) to certify the joint robustness of M1,M2, . . .Mn. However,
we found this approach to be computationally intensive, and it is hard to scale to larger models.
Nevertheless we found some interesting results for two very simple MNIST models which we report
in the next section.
Using convex adversarial polytope: In order to scale our verification technique to larger models,
we next extended the dual network formulation by Wong and Kolter [29] to be able to handle the
final averaging layer of the averaging ensemble modelM(·). Because this layer is a linear operation,
it can be simulated using a fully connected linear layer in the neural network. And because linear
networks are already supported by their framework, our averaging model can thus be verified.
5 Experiments
This section reports on our experiments extending two different certification techniques, MIPVerify
(Section 5.2) and convex adversarial polytope (Section 5.2), for use with model ensembles in different
frameworks. To conduct the experiments, we produced a set of robust models that are trained to
be diverse in particular ways (Section 5.1) and can be combined in various ensembles. Because of
the computational challenges in scaling these techniques to large models, most of our results are
only for the convex adversarial polytope method and for now we only have experimental results
on MNIST. Although this is a simple dataset, and may not be representative of typical tasks, it is
sufficient for exploring methods for testing joint vulnerability, and for providing some insights into
the effectiveness of different types of ensembles.
5.1 Training Diverse Robust Models
To train the models in the ensemble frameworks, we used the cost-sensitive robustness framework by
Zhang et al. [32], which is implemented based on the convex adversarial polytope work. Cost-sensitive
robustness provides a principled way to train diverse models.
Cost-sensitive robust training uses a cost-matrix to specify seed-target class pairs that are trained to
be robust. If C is the cost matrix, i is a seed class, and t is a target class, then Ci, j = 1 is set when we
want to make the trained model robust against adversarial attacks from seed class i to target class
j, and Ci, j = 0 is set when we don’t want to make the model robust for this particular seed-target
pair. For the MNIST dataset, C is a 10 × 10 matrix. We configure this cost matrix in different ways
to produce different types of model ensembles. This provides a controlled way to produce models
with diverse robustness properties, in contrast to ad-hoc diverse training methods that vary model
architectures or randomize aspects of training. We expect both types of diversity will be useful in
practice, but leave exploring ad-hoc diversity methods to future work.
We conduct experiments on ensembles of two, five, and ten models, trained using different cost
matrices. The different ensembles we used are listed below:
• Two model ensembles where individual models are:
1. Even seed digits robust and odd seed digits robust.
2. Even target digits robust and odd target digits robust.
3. Adversarially-clustered seed digits robust.
4. Adversarially-clustered target digits robust.
• Five model ensembles with individual models that are:
1. Seed digits modulo-5 robust.
2. Target digits modulo-5 robust.
3. Adversarially-clustered seed digits robust.
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Cost Matrix Overall Certified Cost-Sensitive
Model (Ci, j = 1) Robust Accuracy Robust Accuracy
Overall Robust for all i, j 72.7% 72.7%
Even-seeds Robust i ∈ {0, 2, 4, 6, 8} 38.0% 77.5%
Odd-targets Robust j ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 9} 21.1% 86.5%
Seeds (2,3,5,6,8) Robust i ∈ {2, 3, 5, 6, 8} 38.1% 74.0%
Targets (0,1,4,7,9) Robust j ∈ {0, 1, 4, 7, 9} 11.1% 89.7%
Seed-modulo-5 = 0 Robust i ∈ {0, 5} 16.7% 88.0%
Target-modulo-5 = 3 Robust j ∈ {3, 8} 8.3% 94.0%
Seeds (3,5) Robust i ∈ {3, 5} 15.9% 81.1%
Targets (1,7) Robust j ∈ {1, 7} 1.4% 97.0%
Seed-modulo-10 = 3 Robust i ∈ {3} 8.5% 84.2%
Target-modulo-10 = 7 Robust j ∈ {7} 0.2% 98.4%
Table 1: Models trained using cost-sensitive robustness for use in ensembles. One representative
model is shown from each ensemble for the sake of brevity. We show the robust cost-matrix for each
model by listing the i and j values where Ci, j = 1 (Ci, j = 0 for all others), as well as its overall robust
and cost-sensitive accuracy.
4. Adversarially-clustered target digits robust.
• Ten model ensembles:
1. Seed digits robust models.
2. Target digits robust models.
A representative selection of different models we use are described in Table 5.1. The overall robust
model is a single model trained to be robust on all seed-target pairs (this is the same as standard
certifiable robustness training using the convex adversarial polytope). The other models were trained
using different cost-matrices. These cost-matrices are shown in Table 5.1. All these models had
the same architecture, and they were trained on L∞ distance of 0.1. Each model had 3 linear and 2
convolutional layers.
The adversarial clustering was done to ensure digits that appear visually most similar to each other
are grouped together. This similarity between a pair of digits was measured in terms of how easily
either digit of the pair can be adversarially targeted to the other digit. These results are consistent
with our intuitions about visual similarity — for example, MNIST digits 2, 3, 5, 8 are visually quite
similar, and we also found them to be adversarially similar, hence clustered together.
5.2 Certifying using MIPVerify
We used the MIP verifier on two shallow MNIST networks. One of the networks had two fully-
connected layers, and the other had three fully-connected layers. The two-layer network was trained
to be robust on even-seeds and the three-layer network on odd-seeds. We used adversarial training
using PGD attacks to robustly train the models. Even with adversarial training, however, the models
were not really robust. Even at L∞ perturbation of  = 0.02, which is very low for MNIST dataset, the
models only had robust accuracy of 23% and 28% respectively. The reason for the lack of robustness
is because the networks were very shallow and lacked a convolutional layer. We could not make the
models more complex because doing so makes the robust certification too performance-intensive.
Still, even with these non-robust models, we can see some interesting results for the ensemble of the
two models. We discuss them below.
To understand the robustness possible by constructing an ensemble of the two models, we compute the
minimal L1 adversarial perturbation for 100 test seeds for the two single networks and the ensemble
average network built from them. We used L1 distance because the MIP verifier performs better
with this, due its linear nature, compared to L2 or L∞ distances. More than 90% of the seeds were
verified within 240 seconds. Figure 2 shows the number of seeds that can be proven robust using MIP
verification at a given L1 distance for each model independently, the maximum of the two models,
and the ensemble average model. The verifier was not always able to find the minimal necessary
7
Figure 2: Number of test seeds certified to be robust by the single models and the ensemble average
model for different L1 perturbation distance constraints.
perturbation for the ensemble network within the time limit of 240 seconds. In those cases, we
reported the maximum adversarial distance proven to be safe at the time when time limit exceeded –
which respresents an upper bound of minimal adversarial perturbation. We note from the figure that
number of examples certified by the ensemble average model is higher than that for either individual
model at all minimal L1 distances.
In general, though, we found the MIP Verificaton does not scale well with networks complex enough
to be useful in practice. Deeper networks and use of convolutional layers makes the performance of
MIP Verify significantly worse. Furthermore, we found that robust networks were harder to verify
than non-robust networks with this framework. Because of this, we decided not to use this approach
for the remaining experiments which is more practical networks.
5.3 Convex adversarial polytope certification
As the MIP verification does not scale well to larger networks, for our remaining experiments we
use the convex adversarial polytope formulation by Wong et al. [29]. We conduct experiments with
ensembles of two, five, and ten models, using the models described in Table 5.1. Table 2 summarizes
the results.
Joint robustness of two-model ensembles. We evaluated two-model ensembles with different
choices for the models, using the three composition methods. We ensured that the averaging ensemble
could be treated as a single sequential model made of fully-connected linear layers, so that the robust
verification formulation was still valid when applied on it. To do this, we had to first convert the
convolutional layers of the single models into linear layers, and then the linear layers of the two
models were combined to create larger linear layers for the joint model. We can then calculate the
robust error rates of the ensemble average model, as well as the unanimity and majority ensembles
for the two-model ensemble. The key here is that no changes were needed to be made to the existing
verification framework.
Table 2 shows each ensemble’s robust accuracy. For two-model ensembles, the unanimity and the
majority frameworks are the same. Thus we can use the same ensemble average technique to certify
them. For adversarial clustering into 2-models, we used two clusters – one for digits (2, 3, 5, 6, 8)
and the other for digits (0, 1, 4, 7, 9).
Compared to the single overall robust model, where 72.7% of the test examples can be certified
robust, with two-model ensembles we can certify up to 78.1% of seeds as robust (using the averaging
composition with the adversarially clustered seed robust models).
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Models Composition Certified Robust Normal Test Error Rejection
Overall Robust Single 72.7% 5.0% -
Even/Odd-seed Unanimity 74.7% 1.3% 5.0%Average 75.9% 3.3% -
Clustered seed (2) Unanimity 77.3% 1.5% 6.0%Average 78.1% 3.0% -
Seed-modulo-5 Unanimity 84.1% 0.3% 8.1%Average 85.3% 1.7% -
Clustered seed (5) Unanimity 83.8% 0.7% 7.1%Average 84.3% 1.4% -
Seed-modulo-10 Unanimity 85.4% 0.1% 9.7%Average 85.6% 1.5% -
Table 2: Robust certification and normal test error and rejection rates for single model and two, five,
and ten-model ensembles for L∞ adversarial examples with  = 0.1.
(a) Cluster Two-Model Ensemble
(b) Modulo-5 Seeds Ensemble (c) Ten-model ensemble
Figure 3: Number of test examples certified to be jointly robust using each model ensemble for
different  values.
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(a) The one test example that is incorrectly classified
by all ten models. (Labeled as 6, predicted as 1.)
(b) Examples of rejected test examples for which
models disagree on the predicted class.
Figure 4: Test examples that are misclassified or rejected by the ten-model ensemble.
We reran all the above experiments for all  values from 0.01 to 0.20 to see how the joint robustness
changes as the attacks get stronger. Figure 3(a) shows the results from the adversarially clustered
seeds two-model ensemble; the results for the other ensembles show similar patterns and are deferred
to Appendix A. For  values up to 0.1, which is the value used for training the robust models, the
ensemble model is able to certify more seeds compared to the single overall robust model. We also
note that the models that are trained to be target-robust, rather than seed-robust, perform much worse.
With even and odd target-robust models we were able to certify only 35.6% of test examples. We
believe the reason for this is that the evaluation criteria of robustness is inherently biased against
models that are trained to target-robust. Because, when evaluating, we always start from some test
seed, and try to find an adversarial example from that seed – which is not what the target-robust
models are explicitly trained to prevent.
Five-model Ensembles. Our joint certification framework can be extended to ensembles of any
number of models. We trained the five models to be robust on modulo-5 seed digits. Ensembles of
these models had better certified robustness than the best two-model ensembles. For example, with
averaging composition 85.3% of test examples can be certified robust (compared to our previous
best result of 78.1% with two models). Figure 3(b) shows how the number of certifiable test seeds
drops with increasing , but worth noting is the large gap between any individual model’s certifiable
robustness and that for the average ensemble. We also trained model by adversarially clustering into
5-models – for digits (4, 9), (3, 5), (2,8), (0, 6) and (1, 7). For the clustered seed robust ensemble, the
results were slightly worse (84.3%) than modulo-5 seeds robust model. One difference between the
two-model and five-model ensembles is that in the latter, the unanimity and the majority frameworks
are different. We found that independent certification does not really work for majority framework.
We were able to certify almost no test seeds for the majority framework for five-model ensembles.
Ten-model Ensembles. Finally, we tried ensembles of ten models, each trained to be robust for a
selected seed digit (0, 1, 2, . . . , 9). The certified robust rate of the 10-model ensemble trained to be
seed robust was 85.6%. This is slightly higher than the 5-model ensemble (85.3%), but perhaps not
worth the extra performance cost. It is notable, though, that the unanimity model reduces the normal
test error for this ensemble to 0.1%. This means that out of 1000 test seeds, 853 were certified to be
robust, 48 were correctly classified but could not be certified, 97 were rejected due to disagreement
among the models, and 1 was incorrectly classified by all 10 models. Figure 4 shows the one test
example where all models agree on a predicted class but it is not the given label (Figure 4(a), and
selected typical rejected examples from the 97 tests where the models disagree (Figure 4(b)).
Summary. Figure 5 compares the robust certification rate for the two, five, and ten-model ensembles.
Clustered seed robust models generally tend to perform well, although just random modulo seed
robust models perform almost just as well.
One potential issue with any ensemble models is the possibility of false positives. In our case, the
use of multiple models in the unanimity and majority frameworks also introduce the possibility of
rejecting benign inputs. As the number of models in a unanimity ensemble increases, the rejection
rate on normal inputs increases since if any one model disagrees the input is rejected. However, if the
false rejection rate is reasonably low, then in many situations that may be an acceptable trade-off for
higher adversarial robustness. The results in Table 2 are consistent with this, but show that even the
ten-model unanimity ensemble has a rejection rate below 10%. For more challenging classification
tasks, strict unanimity composition may not be an option if rejection rates become unacceptable, but
could be replaced by relaxed notions (for example, considering a set of related classes as equivalent
for agreement purposes, or allowing some small fraction of models to disagree).
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Figure 5: Number of test seeds certified to be jointly robust using ten models, five models, two
models and single model for different  values.
6 Conclusion
We extended robust certification models designed for single models to provide joint robustness
guarantees for ensembles of models. Our novel joint-model formulation technique can be used to
extend certification frameworks to provide certifiable robustness guarantees that are substantially
stronger than what can be obtained using the verification techniques independently. Furthermore, we
have shown that cost-sensitive robustness training with diverse cost matrices can produce models
that are diverse with respect to joint robustness goals. The results from our experiments suggest
that ensembles of models can be useful for increasing the robustness of models against adversarial
examples. These is a vast space of possible ways to train models to be diverse, and ways to use
multiple models in an ensemble, that may lead to even more robustness. As we noted in our motivation,
however, without efforts to certify joint robustness, or to ensure that models in an ensemble are diverse
in their vulnerability regions, the apparent effectiveness of an ensemble may be misleading. Although
the methods we have used cannot yet scale beyond tiny models, our results provide encouragement
that ensembles can be constructed that provide strong robustness against even the most sophisticated
adversaries.
Availability
Open source code for our implementation and for reproducing our experiments is available at:
https://github.com/jonas-maj/ensemble-adversarial-robustness.
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A Additional Experimental Results
(a) Even/odd seeds robust (b) Even/odd targets robust (c) Clustered Targets
Figure 6: Number of test seeds certified to be jointly robust using the individual models and different
two-model ensembles average framework for different  values.
(a) Modulo-5 Targets Robust (b) Modulo-5 Seeds Robust (c) Clustered Targets
Figure 7: Number of test examples certified to be jointly robust using the individual models and the
5-model ensembles average framework with different  values.
Figure 8: Number of test examples certified to be jointly robust using the individual models and the
10-model ensemble average framework with targets robust for different  values.
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